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public healthNew and re-emerging pathogens with epidemic potential have
threatened global health security for the past century.1 As with the
recent Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) epidemic, the Zika Virus (ZIKV)
outbreak has yet again surprised and overwhelmed the interna-
tional health community with an unexpected event for which it
might have been better prepared.
ZIKV was ﬁrst identiﬁed in Uganda in 1947, was also found in
Gabon in 2007 and may be endemic in much of tropical Africa
without receiving much attention.2 The current ZIKV epidemic
facing the Americas,3 was declared a ‘‘Public Health Emergency of
International Concern (PHEIC)’’ by the World Health Organization
on 1st February 2016.4,5 Preceding the declaration of a Global
Public Health Emergency by 4 days was the release of the United
Nations report ‘‘Protecting Humanity from Future Health Crises.
Report of the High-level Panel on the Global Response to Health
Crises (UN 26 Jan 2016)’’.6 The report recommends that countries
be able to ‘‘If deemed necessary, diagnostic teams must be
deployed to investigate unusual cases. These teams must also have
access to laboratory capacities to test samples and to provide rapid
test results.’’6 This is simply not realistic for the major part of the
UN member countries.
The ZIKV outbreak has spread further into South- and Central
America, into the Caribbean and will most likely spread into
Southern United States in areas where Aedes spp mosquitoes are
present.7 There is also a risk of ZIKV introduction into Southern
Europe where Ae. albopictus mosquitoes are present.8 The WHO
‘‘Zika strategic response framework and joint operations plan,
January-June 2016’’ describes the current global distribution, the
spread and nature of ZIKV infection as well as its potential
association with microcephaly and neurological complications.7
The report also highlights a clear need for accurate and scalable
surveillance methods, and emphasizes the need to increase the
capacity to diagnose ZIKA in infected countries, for improving data
collection, surveillance and vector control, and 6 Million USD has
been allocated to research. However the plan expects national
authorities to establish laboratory testing.http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijid.2016.02.1007
1201-9712/ 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of International So
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).The present ZIKV outbreak again exposes an unprepared global
public health system.
Surveillance of infections is based on reporting cases of illness,
often syndromic reporting of CNS or pulmonary infections among
others, but unspeciﬁed brief febrile illnesses are rarely reported,
even in pregnant women. In addition, assigning a possible
diagnosis to syndromic surveillance requires suitable laboratory
tests to be readily available for the causative agent and require a
considerable laboratory capacity. During the ﬁrst six months of the
Ebola virus disease (EVD) epidemic in West Africa, the weak
diagnostic laboratory capacity in the affected countries was an
important factor in the rapid spread of the outbreak.9 As a result of
intense international efforts, over 27 laboratories were established
to provide rapid in-country testing for Ebola virus. These
laboratories included both mobile and temporary laboratories
equipped to do molecular diagnostic testing and several laborato-
ries to provide local genomic sequencing of the virus to help in
contact tracing. However, since the laboratories were mostly run
by Non Governmental Organizations and volunteers from overseas
public health laboratories, most of these efforts provided only a
temporary solution, rather than a long-term sustainable solution.
Furthermore these laboratories were focused on a single, known
infection.
The greatest laboratory need for epidemiological surveillance
and clinical management for the ongoing ZIKV outbreak in Brazil
and Latin America is for an easy to use, robust, affordable, rapid,
sensitive, and speciﬁc diagnostic test for ZIKV. The current
estimates of the number of infections is 134,460 suspected cases,
2,765 conﬁrmed and 12 fatal outcomes, constantly rising.10
Current diagnostic tests for ZIKV are limited;11 the current gold
standard test is RT-PCR but this remains unavailable to most clinics
due to the associated cost and a shortage of trained personnel. The
urgent need for new methods for diagnostics that are scalable,
accurate and accessible were highlighted in the recent WHO
report.7 While the WHO has called for strengthening of national
capabilities, most national public health reference laboratories,
where they exist, do not have the equipment or expertise to
identify unknown pathogens in clinical samples, or in many cases
even to look for the many known pathogens that may be
uncommon to their own geographical area.
In the present ZIKV outbreak, it is difﬁcult to fully understand
how the infection could spread for over a decade in Asia and
the Paciﬁc without being picked up by ongoing surveillance
programs.ciety for Infectious Diseases. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
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more pathogenic virus where previous exposure does not provide
protective immunity? After all, ZIKV associated microcephaly,
Guillain-Barre´ and retinitis have not been reported from Asia or
Africa. Are similar viruses circulating in Asia and Africa providing a
certain degree of cross protection, alleviating the symptoms
whereas the population in the Americas is immunologically
naı¨ve?2 Has the virus changed to become better adapted to the
Aedes spp mosquito making transmission more efﬁcient? At
present we simply don’t know, but many scientists around the
world have recognized the urgency with which we need to answer
these questions and studies are ongoing.
The public health community has over the past twenty years
expanded syndromic surveillance to less traditional approaches
including data mining, analysis of internet search trends as well as
monitoring the consumption of certain drugs as indicators of
potential outbreaks etc.12 However, without proper and rapid
laboratory back up, syndromic surveillance cannot provide a full
solution to the problem and thus will delay the implementation of
informed public health measures. We have previously highlighted
the constant threat of new emerging viruses to Africa and the lack
of laboratory infrastructure in Africa to allow the monitoring of the
existence and spread of new infectious diseases threats like the
Middle East Respiratory Syndrome, MERS,13 and re-emerging ones
like Ebola Virus Disease.9 Despite this, there appears to be a lack of
awareness of this urgent but unmet need.
There is now a call for a reorganization of the WHO to be better
able to cope with outbreaks.14 While this is a welcome initiative,
we fear that again emphasis will be placed on surveillance and
reporting and not on laboratory capacity. The call for upgrading
national capacity in detecting and analyzing new or emerging
pathogens is in principle correct, but it must be realized that the
capacity to perform the required analysis looking for new, so far
unknown pathogens, or known but unexpected pathogens and
analyzing the vast amount of data from genomic studies, can at
present be done in a very few places. As examples Nipah virus and
SARS was identiﬁed by the CDC and MERS by the Erasmus Medical
Center, Netherlands not national laboratories.15–17 Except for a
very limited number of countries, only academic centers have the
capacity to perform this type of analysis. However academic
centers are invariably funded by research grants and it is thus not
certain that the appropriate samples will reach such laboratories
and again not certain that the right analysis will be performed and
in time – it has to ﬁt into the research strategy and is thus
haphazard.
To adequately address the global concern over preparedness to
identify the next emerging global infectious disease threat, countries
require high level laboratory capacity with the capacity to undertake
diagnostics and genomics, allowing the identiﬁcation of new or
emerging pathogens, as well as molecular analysis to allow the
identiﬁcation of antimicrobial resistance. The recent study of HIV
resistance to tenofovir showed an alarming spread of tenofovir
resistance, which again illustrate that the development of infra-
structure and surveillance without proper laboratory backup – in
this case drug susceptibility testing of HIV – will result in long-term
failure of the interventions.18 This also applies to surveillance of
MDR- and XDR TB, without susceptibility testing new drugs cannot
be introduced in patient care.19This need exceeds what is possible to
establish in most countries even industrialized countries. The
international community must consider the longevity of their
support. Investment in human resources from affected or potentially
affected countries have started with the Ebola crisis but this efforts
seem not to be sustained because when the danger disappears so
does the interest of the donors.
Sub-Saharan African countries have suffered from recurrent
outbreaks of new and emerging infectious diseases. Regionalpublic health laboratory networks established by WHO AFRO and
its Member States, along with their technical partners, undertake
the reporting of these outbreaks. However much of sub-Saharan
Africa have weak health systems, inadequate resources, and poor
capacity to identify and respond quickly and effectively to disease
outbreaks, making them very vulnerable to the devastating effects
of most infectious diseases epidemics. The scale and overwhelming
effects of the recent EVD epidemic in West Africa clearly
demonstrates this. This situation is compounded by lack of
preparedness and capacity to conduct comprehensive and well-
coordinated research in response to such disease threats.
The establishment of high quality laboratory capacity will
require careful review of existing structures and capacity, mapping
of the current diagnostic capacity of national reference laboratories
for all the 47 Member States in AFRO,20,21 most probably sharing
reference laboratory facilities between several countries Oppor-
tunities now presented by Europe-Africa initiatives like the
European & Developing Countries Clinical Trials Partnership
(EDCTP) must be seized.22
It is important that investments into developing laboratory
capacity within countries are tailored towards moving away
from the age-old single pathogen screening approach. Advances
in molecular biology,23,24 and other technologies,25 now allow
for rapid screening for multiple pathogens and their antibiotic
sensitivity patterns and reporting them within hours.26,27 There
is also a need to establish sentinel regional centres in each
continent, which can provide high level laboratory support
and analysis to national governments and international orga-
nizations.
Such centers should be established with additional support
from industry and international donors comparable to The Global
Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria and instruments for
sharing data with industry established. The centers should also
have the responsibility for safely and rapidly transporting
samples, so that an interesting sample from for instance South
Sudan is just a phone call away from being picked up on location,
transported and analyzed no matter whether it is a HIV or TB
treatment failure or fever of unknown origin with respiratory
symptoms.
This would ﬁll current gaps in surveillance and diagnostic
capabilities to monitor the introductions of new or re-merging
pathogens with epidemic potential into a community. Calls for the
creation by the World Health Organization (WHO) of a new
‘‘Centre for Emergency Preparedness and Response’’ that has real
command and control capacity and has the personnel and
laboratory resources it needs to respond should be supported
strongly since coordination and surveillance is critical to prevent-
ing another disastrous epidemic like EVD. However we fear that
without support from industry funding will be inadequate. We
hope that the ZIKV outbreak will turn out to be storm in a teacup.
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